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A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF STATE REGULATION OF
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
Stanley SIEGEL *
Stianle Siegel analyzes the manner in which state law addresses issues of accounting principles. He
uses corporate asset distributions to illustrate how state laws do not properly define accounting
concepts. The resulting ambiguity in determininhg appropriate accounting principles makes it difficult
for the corporate planner to ascertain when a distribution is proper. Conceding that Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles are constantly changing, tie author points out that they represent a narrower
class of variability than current state law. The article concludes by recommending that state law
incorporate GAAP on a selective basis.
1. Introduction
Contemporary writers in the area of corporate finance, particularly those
concerned with legal constraints on corporate financial activities, appear to
have reached a remarkable consensus that the traditional requirements of
corporate capital structure - including minimum capital, par-value stock, and
the separation of legal capital from capital surplus and retained earnings - are
unnecessary [1]. Furthermore, they have argued for eliminating in large part
the usual statutory limitations on corporate distributions, whether in the form
of dividends or redemptions of stock, retaining only a test of solvency
following distribution [2]. These arguments have borne fruit in the form of
radically changed corporation laws, beginning with California [31, and continu-
ing thereafter with revisions to the Model Business Corporation Act [4].
Although this changed view of legal capital has not yet found wide legislative
acceptance, we may expect that it will in due course. One might conclude,
therefore, that state law is finally about to withdraw - at least in part - from
an area in which it has shown stunning incompetence over the past several
decades: the choice and application of accounting principles. This conclusion
would be erroneous.
State legal regulation is intimately concerned with the financial status and
performance of enterprises. Even if the revised structure of the Model Business
* Professor of Law. University of California, Los Angeles.
0167-9333/85/S3.30 ©D 1985. Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland)
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
S. Siegel / State regulation of accountingprinciples
Corporation Act finds immediate wide acceptance - a somewhat unlikely
prospect - the problems of defining financial status and performance will still
remain. State law will still look - or refrain from looking or refuse to look - to
accounting principles to determine when corporations may make distributions
to their shareholders. As the law of limited partnerships becomes more
crystallized in this era of expanding tax shelters, similar problems will arise
with respect to-partnership distributions [5]. Similar issues of accounting inhere
in problems of trust law, estate valuation, and utility regulation. There is, in
short, an irreducible minimum of financial information that must be referred
to in state substantive law. These legal references may, as in the past, remain
obscure, leaving to the courts the determination of what accounting principles
are to be applied in interpreting the substantive command of the statutes.
Alternatively, a body of principles may be adopted in the legislation itself, with
appropriate limitations or variations to suit the particular needs of the statu-
tory scheme.
This article examines the manner in which state laws address issues of
accounting principles. These issues have been addressed, if at all, indirectly.
State laws have used accounting terminology and concepts without any clear
sense of their meaning, and in some instances with meanings clearly incon-
sistent with those understood by the accounting profession and by the readers
of financial statements. With few exceptions, the states have evidenced
ignorance of - and in some instances hostility towards - the concept of
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) [6]. As a result, state laws
have created confusion for attorneys and accountants alike, and have posed
impediments to development and implementation of GAAP. A few states have
adopted GAAP, in some degree, as a set of financial reporting standards
within their corporation laws [7]. The principles that have been adopted in
other state statutes, however, often have been ill-suited to the implementation
of the underlying policy of the legislation.
The next two sections of this article illustrate the problems of incorporating
accounting principles into state laws. The final section suggests several legisla-
tive approaches to the problem of accounting standards in state law.
2. Direct and indirect regulation of accounting principles under state law
2.1. The need for reference to accounting principles in state law
State laws governing a variety of financial transactions refer to accounting
concepts for their substantive character. These include most notably state law
limitations on distributions of assets by corporations and limited partnerships.
Other state enactments - covering subjects ranging from public utility regu-
lation to trust law and state taxation - also embody important elements of
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accounting principles. To illustrate the problems, the discussion here focuses
on problems raised by the corporation and partnership laws.
Corporate asset distributions, in the form of dividends, redemptions. or
stock repurchases, are universally limited by state corporation laws [8]. Most
jurisdictions retain the "earned surplus" standard. The language in the Model
Business Corporation Act (prior to the 1980 revisions) is quite typical of the
"earned surplus" requirement:
Dividends may be declared and paid in cash or property only out of the unreserved and
unrestricted earned surplus of the corporation, except as otherwise provided in this
section.. .19].
Variations on this theme can be found in the corporation laws of many
important jurisdictions, including New York [10], Delaware [11], and New
Jersey [12].
Notably absent from these statutory formulations is any reference to
GAAP. Indeed, with a few exceptions, the statutes give no guidance whatever
on the choice or application of accounting principles. One might expect that
the courts would look to GAAP or some legally-defined, but similar, collection
of concepts. Litigation on the meaning of dividend statutes is uncommon,
however, and a few very prominent decisions have adopted distinctly different
principles, not always with desirable results. In the celebrated case of Randall
v. Bailey [131, New York's highest court held that assets written up in value by
appraisal could support the declaration and payment of a dividend. The
subsequent bankruptcy of the payor corporation did very little to encourage
widespread use of this dividend-enhancement technique, and a flurry of
decisions and statutory amendments resulted in at least one accounting princi-
ple - prohibition of appraisal write-ups - becoming a part of the laws of
several states [14]. At least one state [15] and the revised Model Act [16] have
taken the opposite tack, explicitly authorizing appraisal valuation as a basis for
unrestricted dividend distribution.
The machinations of corporations wishing to distribute dividends, but not
satisfying the statutory standards, have long been the subject of critical
comment. The most vocal and effective of critics of state regulation of
dividends and corporate capital structure, Bayless Manning, wrote a text on
the subject [17], advocating that state regulation should be largely eliminated.
In California, the Manning approach was adopted almost intact [18]. In the
revised Model Act, it was adopted fully [19]. Do these changes render it
unnecessary for the states to concern themselves any longer with accounting
principles?
Even a cursory examination of the California act demonstrates the remain-
ing need for accounting principles in state corporate law. The two-fold
dividend test of that act incorporates accounting principles at several levels. In
the first instance, dividends and other distributions may validly be made in the
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amount of the corporation's "retained earnings," a concept intentionally
drawn from GAAP [20]. The second prong of the California test, that assets be
at least equal to one and one-quarter times liabilities [21], similarly requires
reference to accounting principles. California, along with a few other states,
clearly calls for application of GAAP in these determinations [22].
The revised Model Act follows a different and perhaps more controversial
course: the standard for permissible distributions is entirely based on the
balance sheet and on a test of solvency. If the corporation is solvent im-
mediately after the distribution, and if at that time assets exceed liabilities. the
distribution is permissible [23]. Despite the apparent simplicity of this stan-
dard, an issue of accounting principles remains: on what basis will assets and
liabilities be reflected for purposes of determining whether the standard has
been met? Unlike California, the revised Model Act gives an ambiguous
answer. The drafters, for reasons that will be discussed below [24], chose not to
adopt GAAP. While the Model Act does not reject GAAP, it gives little
comfort to those who rely upon GAAP to determine the appropriateness of a
corporate distribution.
A somewhat similar set of ambiguities faces the lawyer advising a limited
partnership with respect to distributions. For sixty years, the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act left the question of legality of distributions to partners to the
following cryptic phrase:
A limited partner shall have the right to receive a share of the profits or other compensation
by way of income, and to the return of his contribution as provided in Sections 15 and 16
[25].
In the 1976 revision, the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA) adopted
even more ambiguous distribution standards:
A partner may not receive a distribution from a limited partnership to the extent that, after
giving effect to the distribution, all liabilities of the limited partnership, other than liabilities
to partners on account of their partnership interests, exceed the fair value of the partnership
assets [26].
The standards for "fair value," if any, are not stated, nor is any justification
offered for adopting a different standard for distributions in limited partner-
ships than in corporations. Moreover, California, unique in this as in many
other areas, adopted its own formulation of the Revised ULPA:
A partner is obligated to return a distribution from a limited partnership to the extent that.
immediately after giving effect to the distribution ... all liabilities of the limited
partnership, other than liabilities to partners on account of their interest in the limited
partnership and liabilities as to which recourse of creditors is limited to specified property
of the limited partnership, exceed the fair value of the partnership assets, provided that the
fair value of any property that is subject to a liability as to which recourse of creditors is so
limited shall be included in the partnership assets only to the extent that the fair value of
the property exceeds this liability [27).
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Here again, the meaning of the valuation standard "fair value" is open to
question [28].
2.2. Variability in terminology and standards under state law
Generally, state statutes make no explicit references to accounting princi-
ples. The terminology used, though capable of interpretation under GAAP,
may be construed in several alternative ways. The most common formulations
in dividend statutes use the terms "assets," "liabilities," "surplus", and "earned
surplus" in definitions that defy ready interpretation [29]. Thus, section 2 of
the Model Act reads as follows:
(i) "Net assets" means the amount by which the total assets of a corporation exceed the
total debts of the corporation ...
(k) "Surplus" means the excess of the net assets of a corporation over its stated capital.
(1) "Earned surplus" means the portion of the surplus of a corporation equal to the
balance of its net profits, income, gains and losses from the date of incorporation ...
after deducting subsequent distributions to shareholders and transfers to stated capital
and capital surplus to the extent such distributions and transfers are made out of earned
surplus [30].
The meaning of "earned surplus" ultimately turns on the meaning of "total
assets," as to which the original Model Act gave no guidance. Are total assets
to be stated under GAAP or valued periodically by appraisers, or is some other
method or combination of methods permissible? The absence of significant
litigation on this point is both understandable and disturbing. Given the
potential liability of directors and shareholders for illegal distributions [31],
and the ability of careful corporate planners to create the necessary "surplus"
if it is not already present in adequate amount [32], one would expect that the
issue of illegality would arise only rarely, and then only when the lawyering
was faulty. However, the absence of any substantial decisional gloss on these
ambiguous terms leaves the corporate planner in a quandary. As one leading
commentator has suggested, there must be instances - though it would be
difficult to evaluate empirically their importance - in which attorneys have
counseled against effecting an economically desirable distribution because it
could not meet the statutory standard [33]. Because the standards are unclear,
there will inevitably be situations in which the advice to distribute or not to
distribute will be wrong.
In the area of partnership law, the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership
Act adopts a standard of "fair value," with no further explanation [34]. Since
the meaning of "fair value" has yet to be construed in the context of this new
act, and since the meaning of this term has been the subject of widely varying
interpretations in other contexts [35], the partnership planner must similarly
contend with ambiguity.
As noted earlier, several statutes have clarified the applicable standards,
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whether by narrowing the permissible accounting techniques or by adopting, to
a greater or lesser degree, generally accepted accounting principles [36]. The
revised financial provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act follow a
different course. The revised language contains the most permissive standard
with respect to corporate distributions, prohibiting distributions only to the
extent that after giving effect thereto: (1) the corporation would be unable to
pay its debts as they become due in the ordinary course of business (an
insolvency test); or (2) the corporation's total assets would be less than the sum
of its total liabilities and - unless otherwise provided in its articles - the
preferential liquidation rights of any outstanding preferred stock (a balance
sheet test) [37]. Accounting principles are not determinative of a firm's actual
ability to pay and are, therefore, essentially irrelevant under an insolvency test.
However, satisfaction of the balance sheet test requires application of account-
ing principles. On this point, the Model Act abdicates all responsibility. The
applicable standards are:
Determinations under subparagraph (b) [the balance sheet test] may be based upon (i)
financial statements prepared on the basis of accounting principles and practices that are
reasonable in the circumstances, or (ii) a fair valuation or other method that is reasonable in
the circumstances [38].
The Committee on Corporate Laws stated:
Incorporating technical accounting terminology and specific accounting concepts into
new section 45 was rejected, principally because such terminology and concepts are
constantly under review and subject to revision by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the Securities and Exchange
Commission and others.
While the directors will normally be entitled to use generally accepted accounting
principles and to give presumptive weight to the advice of professional accountants with
respect thereto, it is important to recognize that the new Section requires the use of
accounting practices and principles that are reasonable in the circumstances, and does not
constitute a statutory enactment of generally accepted accounting principles. In the view of
the Committee, the widespread controversy concerning various accounting principles, and
their constant reevaluation, requires a statutory standard of reasonableness, as a matter of
law, recognizing that there may be equally acceptable alternative solutions to specific issues
as well as areas requiring judgment in interpreting such principles [391.
The revised Model Act solution to the problems of interpretation is,
therefore, to remove essentially all restrictions on distribution. However, not
all state legislatures may agree with this solution. Some jurisdictions, like
California [40), may retain some substantive restrictions even after possible
liberalization. More importantly, even under the most permissive statutory
structure some standards must remain [41]. The problems of measurement
posed by permissible accounting principles are inescapable, and the Model Act
approach is not an effective solution to the problem.
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3. The implications of variability in state accounting standards
3.1. Substantive non-uniformity among state laws
Perhaps the strongest argument that might be made for refusal to refer to
GAAP within the state statutes is that the statutory policy may call for
different substantive standards of accounting. For example, it would be clearly
inappropriate to insist upon full application of GAAP in the calculation of
taxable income under federal and state income tax regimes, for the reason that
a myriad of tax policies are at variance with the purposes of GAAP. The tax
policies have among their objectives raising of revenue, creation of incentives
for certain conduct, and establishment of disincentives for other conduct.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles have as their principal objective the
generation of informative financial statements for use by investors, creditors,
and others. As an illustration, the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS)
introduced by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 [421 was conceived as
advancing the objective of increasing capital investment; its variance from
GAAP accounting for depreciation was conscious and intended [43].
To the extent that variation from GAAP is a reflection of articulated state
policies, the debate must focus on the desirability of the policies and not on the
incidental fact that GAAP will not be followed. There is, however, very little
evidence that the ambiguity and variability of corporate dividend standards -
or of partnership distribution limitations - was borne of such conscious
legislative policy concerns. A class of notable exceptions, discussed earlier
herein, encompasses the state laws that have spoken definitively on the
question of appraisal revaluation of assets [44]. With this exception, however, it
does not appear unfair to characterize the present collection of state laws
bearing on dividends as being unintentionally obscure. The language of most
of these laws can be traced to the first few decades of this century, a time when
even accountants had not clearly articulated accepted principles of reporting.
It is not surprising, therefore, that many of the statutes (most of which to this
day continue to use the long-abandoned terminology of "earned surplus" [45])
neither articulate an internal set of accounting principles nor refer to GAAP.
Less understandable is the decision of the Model Act draftsmen to continue
that ambiguity through the last decades of this century. In the approximately
fifty years since the early dividend statutes were drafted, the principles of
accounting have been widely debated and at least partly crystallized. It is true,
as the Committee on Corporate Laws has said, that "such terminology and
concepts are constantly under review and subject to revision. ... " [46].
However, the Committee's choice is one of conscious preservation of ambigu-
ity, as the Act sets forth no standards other than reasonableness. If widely
adopted, the revised Model Act formulation is likely to result in the applica-
tion of varying standards to corporate distributions not only from state to
state, but from court to court and attorney to attorney within any given state.
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The less conscious choice of the drafters of the revised Uniform Limited
Partnership Act is likely to lead to similar ambiguity, since the term "fair
value" as applied to assets has a very wide range of possible meanings.
3.2. Planning and disclosure problems caused by ambiguous standards
Ambiguity and variability in the state standards produce a series of unfor-
tunate results. Perhaps the most important of these is that the advisor, whether
attorney or accountant, often cannot be sure whether a desired transaction
meets the statutory standard. Undoubtedly, most corporate and partnership
distributions are well within the statutory limitations, however those limita-
tions may be construed. But one important class of transactions, involving
redemption of a major shareholder or repurchase of the interest of a significant
partner, often cannot be so summarily dealt with. For example, commentators
for years have wrestled with the standard applicable to installment repurchase
of corporate shares, in part as an attempt to deal with the surplus limitations
applicable to substantial share repurchases [47]. The timing questions of
installment repurchases may finally have been resolved by the Model Act and
California statutory language [48], but the larger issues of asset valuation and
applicable accounting principles remain.
It can no longer be doubted that the absence of specified standards will
produce ambiguity. The courts are surely in no position today, if ever they
were in such a position, to delineate and apply accounting principles. Apart
from the obvious point that courts consist of lawyers, not accountants, and
that the lawyer's professional competence does not extend to accounting [49],
there is the even larger issue that financial statements are the products of an
extensive and complex set of processes. If, for example, a court should decide
that current valuation of assets is an appropriate standard for testing the
legality of corporate and partnership distributions, how will the court apply
that standard? The accounting profession, facing a similar problem in dealing
with inflation, has had the greatest difficulty in developing an approach to
current valuation; and the firms faced with generating financial statements
under the experimental rules promulgated by the Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board have widely complained of the complexity of adjusting their
GAAP statements to reflect the alternative reporting approach [50]. If the
accounting profession and the reporting companies themselves experience this
level of difficulty in developing financial statements based on principles
different from GAAP, is it reasonable to expect that a court, or a corporate
board of directors, will be able with confidence to evaluate the legality of
distributions made under such alternative standards? As a leading commenta-
tor noted nearly twenty years ago:
It is believed that the difficulties to a court of law in abandoning the accounting approach
to asset valuation are enormous and little recognized. It wilI be seen, for example, that it is
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not simply a question of taking the accountant's balance sheet and adding unrealized
appreciation... . [Vjirtually every single book entry going to make up the entire balance
sheet would be subject to challenge and adjustment [51].
Another troublesome issue is created by prevailing choice-of-law rules,
under which the law of the state of organization generally governs internal
affairs. In general, a corporation organized in State "A" will be governed by
the dividend statute of State "A" even if its business - and the distribution
itself - is primarily centered in another state. Therefore, an adroit corporate
planner can choose as the state of incorporation a state that has the most
favorable rules [52]. Distribution rules rarely rise to the importance of govern-
ing the choice of the original state of incorporation. However, if a major
transaction - such as redemption of a significant shareholder - cannot safely
be implemented under the laws currently applicable to a corporation, counsel
may advise reincorporation in a state where the laws are clearer and more
favorable. This argument, unfortunately, proves a great deal: the literature
detailing the "Gresham's Law of Corporations" [53] is extensive and familiar
[54]. My point here, however, is somewhat different. I appreciate the argument,
made by several thoughtful commentators, that sharply restrictive state laws on
distributions will ultimately prove ineffective [55]. It is important to realize,
however, that liberal but ambiguous laws with respect to any area requiring
business planning may be equally objectionable, and will similarly be avoided
by those with the wit and resources to do so.
Ambiguity in the governing laws may also have a rebound effect, causing
confusion with respect to the accountant's reporting with respect to the
enterprise. To the extent that legal rules govern permissibility of corporate
distributions, they represent a legal interpretation of the corporate or partner-
ship capital accounts. Although accountants have not been entirely constrained
by legal capital rules [56], the tendency to look to legal definitions for
accounting characterization remains.
4. Adoption of GAAP in state laws
4.1. The arguments summarized and evaluated
The principal argument against adoption of GAAP in state laws is that
GAAP represent a changing set of standards, subject to constant revision and
change, and themselves open to ambiguity. As noted above, this argument is a
variant of the perfect being the enemy of the good. Revision, change and some
ambiguity will be characteristic of any set of standards; GAAP provide a
reasonably ascertainable set of standards from time to time, vith a consider-
ably narrower range of doubt than any other alternative. The ability to rely
upon GAAP would provide counsel and business planners a basis for exercise
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of informed business judgment. Arguments based on policy - that certain legal
tests should rest on principles other than GAAP - can be answered directly by
excepting those tests from the general application of GAAP.
On policy grounds one might argue that GAAP should not be applied since
cost-based accounting is unreflective of real asset values and real enterprise
performance. Whatever the merit of this argument, the difficulty of generating
financial statements on a current value or adjusted cost basis suggests that
legal adoption of such a principle might best await the development of a
coherent set of accounting principles on the subject.
On the other hand, it has been suggested that legislative adoption of GAAP
might itself have a constrictive effect on the development of accounting
principles. For example, state laws governing dividend distributions would
undergo vast substantive changes if GAAP embraced the principle of current-
value accounting. Representatives of various corporate constituencies, most
notably creditors, might well lobby against such an adoption of accounting
principles based on the legal effects that the change would cause [57). The legal
problem could, however, be separately addressed by specific legislation, rather
than by insistance upon unchanged accounting principles.
There remain those who would argue that the ultimate decisions on applica-
tion of legal standards must rest with the courts, and that delegation of
rule-making to an outside authority (such as the FASB) is inappropriate as a
matter of policy, and perhaps illegal as well. The argument based on delegation
of rule-making authority does not appear to be well founded; recently it was
rejected at the federal level with respect to the SEC's position that FASB
Statements shall have substantial authoritative support [58]. The ultimate
argument, namely that application of legal standards must remain with the
courts, has merit to the extent that the standard is truly legal. However, when
the principles to be applied are beyond the professional training and com-
petence of lawyers, there is little basis for removing the standard-setting from
the accountants merely because the forum where compliance will be evaluated
is the courtroom.
4.2. Approaches to statutoiy implementation
Complexities in state policies with respect to corporations and partnerships
make it unlikely that blanket adoption of GAAP in the governing statutes
would be desirable. At this writing, no provision flatly adopting GAAP is in
effect in the corporation or partnership laws of any state. The most inclusive
approach to statutory standard-setting is the California General Corporation
Law, which adopts GAAP "subject to any specific accounting treatment
required by a particular section" of the Law [59]. At the other extreme,
selective adoption of GAAP with respect to particular matters governed by a
given law - such as determination of legality of cash dividends, or permissible
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director reliance on financial statements - provides considerable clarification
of applicable standards [601. To the extent that the application of alternative
standards, such as current fair market value, is adopted as state policy, the
statute can so provide explicitly [61].
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liabilities (not including deferred taxes, deferred income and other deferred credits); and (2)
The current assets of the corporation would be at least equal to its current liabilities [or, in
certain circumstances 1 1/4 times current liabilities]....
[211 See supra note 20.
[22] Cal. Corp. Code § 114 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985). See supra note 7.
[23] See MBCA § 45; Revised MBCA § 6A0.
[24] See infra; notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
[25] ULPA § 10(2).
[26] RULPA § 607.
[27] Cal. Corp. Code § 15666, as amended.
[28] As of May 1, 1985, no reported opinions interpret this provision or its use of the phrase
"fair value."
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[29] See generally, Hackney, Accounting Principles in Corporation Law, 30 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 791 (1965).
[30] Model Bus. Corp. Act § 2(i), (k), (1) (1953).
[31] Typical of the director liability provisions is MBCA § 48:
[A] director who votes for or assents to any distribution contrary to the provisions of this
Act or contrary to any restrictions contained in the articles of incorporation, shall, unless he
complies with the standard provided in this Act for the performance of the duties of
directors, be liable to the corporation, jointly and severally with all other directors so voting
or assenting, for the amount of such dividend which is paid or the value of such distribution
in excess of the amount of such distribution which could have been made without a
violation of the provisions of this Act or the restrictions in the articles of incorporation.
Any director against whom a claim shall be asserted under or pursuant to this section ...
shall be entitled to contribution from the shareholders who accepted or received any such
distribution, knowing such distribution to have been made in violation of this Act....
[32] See Manning, supra note 1, at 109-63.
[331 Id. at 87-88.
134] RULPA § 607.
[35] Compare, e.g., Brown v. Hedahl's-QB & R, Inc., 185 N.W.2d 249 (N.D. 1971) with
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), for two different interpretations of "fair
value" in the context of appraisal rights for corporate shareholders.
[36] See supra note 7.
[371 MBCA § 45; revised MBCA § 6.40.
[38] MBCA § 45; revised MBCA § 6A0.
[391 MBCA Amendments, supra note 1. at 1884. See also Goldstein & Hamilton, Tile Revised
Model Business Corporation Act, 39 Bus. Law. 1019, 1021-22 (1983).
[401 Compare Cal. Corp. Code § 500 (West Supp. 1985) (discussed supra at note 20) with
MBCA § 45. The California statute, which was drafted before adoption of the Model Act revisions
and which in large part inspired the new Model Act provisions, also contains an insolvency test.
Cal. Corp. Code § 501 (West 1977). California opted to retain the longstanding accounting test of
retained earnings, and as an alternate test, California permits distributions to be made upon a
balance sheet evaluation. Cal. Corp. Code § 500 (West Supp. 1985). However, instead of a
bare-bones assets-in-excess-of-liabilities criterion, Cal. Corp. Code § 500 provides two additional
levels of creditor protection: assets must exceed liabilities by 25%, and current assets must exceed
current liabilities (as defined). Furthermore, in some instances based on prior corporate perfor-
mance, current assets must exceed current liabilities by 25%.
[41] A recent task force report considers the question whether the insolvency test for corporate
distributions should completely replace all accounting tests, including the minimal balance sheet
tests retained in the Revised Model Act. The report is inconclusive, but it appears quite unlilkely
that any legislature will remove all accounting criteria for distributions. See Current Issues on the
Legality of Dividends from a Law and Accounting Perspective: A Task Force Report, 39 Bus. Law.
289. 303-06 (1983).
[421 I.R.C. § 168 (1954), as amended by the Economic Recovery Tax of 1981 (ERTA) (I.R.C. §
168 (1985)). introduced highly-accelerated depreciation tables for fixed assets as part of a
legislative attempt to spur capital expenditures in a period of economic stagnation. Examples of
the short depreciation periods include equipment, to be written off over a period of three or five
years, and most depreciable real estate, to be depreciated over a period of fifteen years. In 1984,
when economic priorities had shifted, the real estate depreciation period was extended to eighteen
years by the Tax Reform Act of 1984 (I.R.C. § 168 (1985)). No suggestion was made in either act
that the periods chosen reflected the useful lives of the assets involved under GAAP.
[43] See S. Rep. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1981).
[441 See supra note 33.
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[45] The pre-revision MBCA retains the term "earned surplus," and that term remains in most
state dividend statutes to this day. See MBCA § 45. Some thirty years ago, the accounting
profession replaced this term with "retained earnings." See Committee on Ternzinologr, Ace't
Terminology Bull. No. 1, 65-70 (1953).
[46] See MBCA Amendments, supra note 1, at 1884.
(47] The leading article is Herwit2, Installment Repurchase of Stock: Surphs Limitations, 79
Harv. L. Rev. 303 (1965). The principal question, unresolved by the language of most statutes, is
whether the test for distribution must be met at the outset (upon incurrence of the installment
obligation) or as of the payment of each installment, or - perhaps - at both times. This question is
further complicated by the presence in the statutes of two or more standards. e.g., surplus and
solvency. Sound arguments have been made that different standards are applicable at different
times.
[48] The revisions of the MBCA added the following section:
(i) "Distribution" means a direct or indirect transfer of money or other property (except its
own shares) or incurrence of indebtedness by a corporation to or for the benefit of any of
its shareholders in respect of any of its shares whether by dividend or by purchase,
redemption or other acquisition of its shares, or otherwise.
MBCA § 2(i). The drafters' comments state that in the case of an installment repurchase of shares,
the incurrence of the debt constitutes the distribution. See MBCA Amendments, supra note 1, at
1878. Accordingly, the MBCA balance sheet and solvency tests must be satisfied as of that date.
MBCA § 45 further reinforces this position. The same standards are found in Revised MBCA §
6AO.
California takes a somewhat different approach, which may in some instances offer planning
advantages:
[T]he time of any distribution by purchase or redemption of shares shall be the date cash or
property is transferred by the corporation, whether or not pursuant to a contract of an
earlier date; provided, that where a negotiable debt security ... is issued in exchange for
shares the time of the distribution is the date when the corporation acquires the shares in
such exchange.
Cal. Corp. Code § 166. The presumptive rule adopted by California is. therefore, the opposite of
the MBCA rule: the distribution is tested as of each payment. However, California leaves open the
possibility, by using a negotiable debt security, of applying the distribution test at the outset. In
cases where the obligation to be undertaken is substantial, the presumptive California rule may
prove less restrictive than the MBCA rule.
[49] "The law has generally been unwilling to recognize that accountants are experts in
accounting and lawyers and courts are not." 2 H. Marsh, California Corporation Law & Practice
13.7 (1981).
[501 On the subject of current cost and constant dollar accounting, see generally Siegel,
Accounting and Inflation: An Analysis and a Proposal, 29 UCLA L. Rev. 271 (1981).
[51] See Hackney, supra note 29, at 819-21.
[52] Not all states, however, have abstained completely from the application of their corporate
laws to the operations of corporations incorporated elsewhere. Thus, certain non-California
corporations doing business and having shareholders within the state will be subject to various
California rules, including those concerning distributions. See Cal. Corp. Code § 2115.
[53] Gresham's law states that currency with a greater intrinsic value will be hoarded while
currency with the same face value circulates more freely. See, eg., C. Ammer & D. Ammer,
Dictionary of Business and Economics (2d ed. 1984).
[54] Nowhere has the "race to the bottom" been more powerully documented than in the
Report of the Corporation Law Revision Commission of New Jersey, NJ. Stat. Ann., vol. 14A, xi
(West 1969):
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[Sleeking to attract corporations to establish their domiciles within their borders, most
states in recent decades have been increasingly flexible and permissive in revising their
corporation laws.
Pursuing this policy perhaps further than any other state, the Commission believes it is
following sound public policy for New Jersey. It is clear that the major protections to
investors, creditors, employees, customers, and the general public have come, and must
continue to come, from Federal legislation and not from state corporation acts.
See also Cary, Federahsm and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663 (1974).
[551 See generally MBCA Amendments, supra note 1; Manning, supra note 1. at 109-10.
[561 For example. GAAP requires that stock dividends be accounted for by transferring the
fair market value of the new shares issued from retained earnings. By contrast, most state
corporation statutes would appear to require only that the stated capital of the new shares be
transferred out of surplus. See, e.g., MBCA § 45(d); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 173 (1983); N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law § 511 (MeKinney 1963 and Supp. 1984).
[571 For this insight, I am indebted to Prof. Stephen Zeff, who, however, may not agree with
my response to the problem.
[581 See Arthur Andersen & Co. v. SEC [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95.720 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 3, 1976).
[591 Cal. Corp. Code § 114 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985).
[60] See statutes cited supra note 7.
[611 See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 450.1110 (West 1973).
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